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lil THE SUPREt!E COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

nrr

()j.

UTAil,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19013
CLAUllE A. BUUDY,

Defendant-Appellant.
APPLLLAi'lT' S BRIEF
llATURE OF CASE

Defendant-Appellant, Claude Albert Bundy, was charged
with two first degree felony crimes, to wit: rape, in violation
ci §76-5-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and forcible

ooJorny, in violation of §76-5-403, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
1s "mended.
DISPOSITIO" OF LO\ffirl COURT

The Lower Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge,
judgment and imposed a sentence on the verdict of the
: c<r'1

11npane l eJ to try and hear the case,
RELIEF SOUGHT Oli APPEAL

The Defendant-Appellant requests this Court to reverse
J'1c.rc1ent oi' the Lower Court and remand the case to the District
•rd

new trial and other further proceedings.

STATE!!EilT OF FACTS
The Defendant was arrested and chnrg"Ll •.villi L,,,,,
first degree felony crir.ies, consisting of rape and
sodomy.

These acts were alleged to have occurred between t'''

Defendant and a Sherry Christiansen, a female under the age n 1
14 years, not his wife.
The alleged victim was Sherry Christiansen.
was the younger sister of the Defendant's wife.

Sherr 7

The evidence

was that this Sherry had been a babysitter for the Defendant
his wife for a period from April, 1981 through December, 1931
This entailed her having to spend many nights at the Defendant
and his wife's home in connection with the babysitting.

The

Defendant was working either regular work shifts or afternoon
shifts, and the Defendant's wife was working graveyard shifts
The acts were alleged to have occurred on a number of nights
during the period at the home of the Defendant, and some acts
allegedly at the home of the victim.
In addition to the victim,
other witnesses.

the State called five (5)

These were a Douglas Christiansen, the fathN

of the victim and father-in-law of the Defendant; Lori C.
the Defendant's wife; a Dr. Lillian TeiGland, a physician who
examined the victim; Jesus Castaneda, a West Valley City PolicE·
man who made an initial report; and Welby Scott, a West
City Detective who did follow up work in this case,
The only witness for the defense was the DefenuanL
Claude Bundy, '"ho denied the act ions having occurred.
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lJri,>t1

irr ie:>
, 1,1.
,1

the c,J!ling of the Defendant's wife, counsel
uent into char;ibers with the Judge to discuss

1,,11ridteness of the testimony of the wife, and objection

,,1,. t:hc.ereto.

(Tran. of Trial page 23 and 74-82).

The off

cne cecllni discussion concerned the nature of the testimonial
µn',cilege 1.vith regard to marital co=unications.
ut

As a result

the stateBent by the prosecutor that no co=unications

-.wuld be gone into,and the lir;iited nature of the proposed tesimony, counsel for the Defendant did not object on the record

co the calling and examining of the Defendant's wife.

However,

che Defendant 1Jas not present during said discussion, did not
consent to said testimony, and later voiced strong and appropriate objection thereto.

(See discussion at Tran. of Trial

pages 74-32)
At the close of the State's case, the Defendant again
renew=d his raotion for mistrial setting forth the appropriate
statute with regard to competency of Hitnesses.
Trial, pages 159-163).

(See Tran. of

The Court again took the motion under

and the Defendant was called to the stand.
The jury returned with verdicts of guilty on both
•• 0

11nt .c;, ancl the Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms
the Utah State Prison of five years to life.

ce111,2d

The Court than

the Defendant's 1;iotion for :aistrial.
ARGill!E:lT
POLIT l •

THA'.'.' Tl-iE TRIAL COURT E!PROPERLY
A,JO PL::.E.JUi.JICIALC,Y ALL0 1.JEJ THE
CALLLiG TO THI:: STAlW A:rn THE
1;::::;TIF'lldG OF Tl-iE o:.:FEilDAdT' S
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WIFE.

There has long been recognizcJ, bntli
and be statutory lau, a spous<ll

:it

1..._'(J1:1r;11Jn

l

1

i.vi:iLh IJr1)h1Ji· ,)

circumscribes the testi;non:1 or one spouse agdinst another.
is generally recognized that there are three separate t:rpes
privilege which oight be

in force and effect. In

Court bt ..

counsel for the State and t.1e Court apparently concerned the'lselves with two of the privileges, but ignored the third, as
raised by counsel for the Defendant below.
'.Lhe first type of privilege is normally knmm as c:1e
"coapelled" privilege.

This provides that a spouse can not ·ie

compelled to give evidence against tl1eir spouse.

Such is ex-

plicitly stated in the Utah Constitution, Article I, §12.
was not really an issue in the case below, as the Defendant'3
spouse, Lori C. Bundy, was willing to testify against her husband.
The second type of marital privilege is norr.ially referred to as the marital co!TIIilunication privilege.
forth in Rule 28 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

It is set
In essence,

it provides that confidential communications between spouses
are privileged, and can not be testified to absent consent ui
both parties.

i"urther, such privilege exists beyond the term-

nation of the marriage.
7he third t/pe of privilege has to Jo ""it:1 ti1e c
tency of a spouse to tcestify against the other in t,1e au 0 c""c
anv consent.

It is set forth in §73-24-8,

-4-

l'JSJ UCA,

"•'">'" 1

·'

i 1111cnt

part

There are particular relations
in ·,;hi ch it is the policy of the law
to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate.
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in
the following cases:
(1) A husband cannot be examined
for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor can either
during the marriage or afterwards be,
without the consent of the other, examined as to any cou1I!lunication made by one
to the other during the marriage; but
this exception does not apply to civil
action or proceeding by one against the
other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime COLJ8itted by one
against the other, nor for the crime of
deserting or neglecting to support a
spouse of child, nor where it is otherwise specially provided by law.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Mrs. Bundy was
clearly in derogation of the Defendant's substantial rights not
to have her testify without his consent, as she did testify.
l'urther,

tne prohibition contained in the above statute is ex-

ressed in teITJs of competency to testify.

Thus, she was incom-

perent to testify at ali in the absence of his expressed consent.
The discussions of the attorneys' for the parties and
Court indicate that there was no consent by the Defendant and
',1JL ciuch of the concern, mostly expressed off the record, had
do 1.;ith the first two types of spousal privilege, and not the
1.1hic·h was raised by the defense counsel.
11ri"s
l

1](_"

Jl

(See discussion of

r,'ran. of Trial, pages 74-82, and pages 159-163).

At

Jas tne consent of the 0efendant obtained, and in fact,

e ,r1rt>ssed disavmval

and disapproval was noted.

The prejudicial nature of the testimun? s.1.1ulJ ii ..
be clear from the transcript of the trial
charged with rape and forcible sodomy on his wife's litt Le
ter.

He denied that those actions occurred.

Therefore

credibility and believability of the victim and DefenJant <.Jere
crucial, and the showing of loyalties to those two inJiviJuaL
would help a jury in its choice of wi.om to believe.

Thus,

fact of the Defendant's wife freely testifying for the State
against her husbanJ could easily be seen by the jury to be
disparaging and prejudicial to the Defendant.

Further, much

0;

her testimony was of a prejudicial nature and manner
put the Defendant in a bad light with the jury

:;

These incluJec

such items as the young age of the Defendant at their marria0e
and her sympathy toward the victim.

In a close case, with two

witnesses giving opposing views of what transpired, such subtle
and indefinite factors often tip the balance in a jury's mind
This Court has also recognized the subtle nature of
violation of this privilege and the prejudice to a Defendant.
In State v. Brown, 383 P.2d 930, 14 Utah 2d 324 (1963), the

de-

fendant had been found guilty of raping a sixteen year old giri.
His defense was alibi in that he haJ been at home with his
at the time the alleged acts occurred.
but his wife did not testify.

The defendant testificc

The district attorney,

in drgucc

to the jury stated that the one person besides the defenJ:int ·· 1
could have testified that he was at home was the defend:rnt'
and she did not testify.

This court helJ that such cor.JLlenc '" 1

orivile;;e ;Jas ,irejudicial error and remanded the case bilck .in•;'

-il-

,

11c'1,;

u·iaL bused merely upon that one comment on the pri'11

1·he case at bar,

the Defendant's wife did testify,

11 L<>rne/ ior the State argued from some of the testimony
I

c,Jci<

llCe that she gave.
rnrnT II:

(See Tran. of Trial, page 193).

THAT OPINIOU TESTIMOHY WAS IMPROPERL y AD!IITTED WTO EVIDEHCE
\IHICH PREJUDICED THE DEFENDA;n
AilD
PLAIU ERROR.

During the course of the trial, evidence was admitted
indicated that a charge a child molestation of the victim
had i.ieen nade with the perpetrator being the victim's father and

the Defendant's father-in-law.

During the course of the trial,

0:ficer Welbv Scott, a detective for West Valley City Police,
that he did follow up work on that accusation.
al so 1Jas allm1ed to testify that the accusations,

in his opinion,

were unfounded and there was no substance to the charge.

Tran. of Trial, page 151).

He

(See

Such an opinion testimony is improper,

nrejudicial to the Defendant, and in the case at bar constitutes
error which this Court can review.
Testimony in the form of an opinion is governed by Rule
•t of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Such Rule states:

(1) If the witness is not testifying
as an expert his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to such
opinions or inferences as the judge finds
(a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to
a clear understanding of his testimony or
to the determination of the fact in issue.
(2) If the witness is testifying as
c1n expert, tes timon;r of the witness in the
form of opinions or inferences is linited
to such opinions as the judge finds are

- 7-

(a) based upon facts or Jdtrl perceived by or personal L:,' kno1m or
made to known to the 1vitness dt 1he
hearing and (b) within the scope of
the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the
witness.
(3) Unless the judge excludes
the testimony he shall be deemed to
have made the findinG requisite to
its admission.
(4) Testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences otherwise admissible under these rules is not
objectionable because it embraces the
ultimate issue or issues to be decided
by the trier of the fact.
Officer Scott, it is submitted, would in this instance
be testifying not as an expert.

The testimony concerns itseli

with a resolution of factual issues and statements, Detective
Scott is not qualified as an expert to resolve factual disputes.
His testir;iony should have been limited to what actions, if anv,
he took in investigating the charges.
Even as an experienced and "expert" police officer,
uetective Scott would not be competent to give his opinion as
he did here.

He would not be testifying based upon his special-

ized knowledge and training, and there is insufficient facts
and data perceived by him to make such an opinion.

Just as an

officer would be prohibited from stating his opinion that, bas2:
upon his experiences as a police officer, a defendant is 6uil: ·
beyond a reasonable doubt or that the evidence presented at er:,.
indicates that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable c:c.'
so this officer should not have been allowed to testL'' ''' ' 1
was no basis to the allegation involving the 'Jictir:i' s :'J 1.:1e 1

- 8-

'-'
l(

1 ( r1(J.-Jnt.

lioweve?r,

it is subrilitted that such an opinion

1riproper in a criminal case, and constitutes "plain

"I

" "u'

ihove testimon/ 11as not objected to by counsel

11

that this Court can review the matter.

'.n a case such as this, here ti1is is an allegation of
c,pe and forcible sodomy on a thirteen year old girl,

and the

uenies that the actions occurred, it is a close case

r •r

a jur; to decide.

Further, subtle matters and factors and

effects may s11ay and influence the jury differently than in
cases involving other crimes and other evidence.

Therefore this

Court should review more closely the evidence adr.iitted at the
Lrial to assure that irilproper subtle influences and factors are
1ot laid before the jury such that they may base their decision
improper matters.
)efendant's denial,

In the case at bar,

in addition to the

there was evidence of both a family cover

and of a family conspiracy against this Defendant with regard
11

this Defendant's actions in pendinG civil divorce litigation.

1cJt familv conspiracy and cover up would include the Defendant's

·.:ite, her sister the victim, and the victim's father.

Therefore

improper opinion by the Detective might have been highly
irei11dic1:il and influential on the jury with regard to resolving
·.lie

uisputes between the Defendant and that family.

As such, this

'"Jurt should strictl; revietv that testimony to insure that improper
.>L1,

JiJ not

influence the jury.
COtJCLUS IOiJ

lt is requested that t'.1is Court reverse the conviction

-9-

and sentence of the Defendant and rem.ind

tl!<e

to the Lower Court for a ne1v trial,

c·,1se

c1,1: 1

er

1v,1s

d

L ,,,,,,

Iii ,;:ii

emotional.iy charged case involving heinous cTir:1es and 11 le:;,tions, and this Court should strictly revie1J the record
Improper evidence,

testimony, and procedures 1Jould have a pacr

tially greater impact on a jury than in most other cases,
fore,

the prejudice to the Defendant and his fundamental righc

not to have his wife testify against him, should mandate a reversal and reEJand.

Further,

the plain error of the opinion

testimony of the Detective, and other evidentury imperfections
in the record, in such a close case, should cause this Court 'c
remand for a new trial.

Although it is recognized that no tria:

are ever perfect, and that errors exist in all trials,
a highly charged and close case as this one,

in

this Court should

remand for a new trial to insure that a jury does not base its
decision on iTiproper factors.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ _ _ day of August,

1983.
ROBERTS

& ROBERTS

Attorney for Appellant
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